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Abstract
Although the link between household size and consumption has strong empirical support, there
is no consistent way in which demographics are dealt with in standard life-cycle models. We
study the relationship between the predictions of the Single Agentmodel (the standard in the lit-
erature) versus a simple model extension (the Demographics model) where deterministic changes
in household size and composition affect optimal consumption decisions. We show theoretically
that the Demographics model is conceptually preferable to the Single Agent model as it captures
economic mechanisms ignored by the latter. However, our quantitative analysis demonstrates
that differences in predictions for consumption are negligible across models, when using stan-
dard calibration strategies. This suggests that it is largely irrelevant which model specification
is used.
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1 Introduction
Consumption-savings life-cycle models are one of the workhorse models of modern macroeco-
nomics. Connecting them to the data requires to take a stand on household size and composition
effects as these are empirically closely related to household consumption over the life-cycle, as
noted by Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999), and Gourin-
chas and Parker (2002). The standard approach in quantitative macroeconomics entails extracting
per-adult equivalent consumption facts from household survey data and using them as targets
to be replicated by Single Agent or Bachelor models, which for consistency are calibrated with
per-adult equivalent income. Put differently, household effects are controlled for in the data but
abstracted from in the modeling environment. Some recent papers in this vein include Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2008), who assess the welfare effects of a rise in wage dispersion and the
welfare gains of completing markets and eliminating income risk; Low and Pistaferri (2010), who
decompose changes in income risk using consumption data based on the predictions of a life-cycle
model; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), who investigate the role of consumer durables for
life-cycle consumption patterns.
There are numerous ways in which household consumption choices might differ from individual
ones, e.g. because of two individuals choosing instead of one, the presence of children, uncertainty
about household’s compositional changes, etc. Probably, the simplest way to take this into account
within the model environment has been introduced by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999)
(henceforth labeled as the Demographics model): household size and composition change determin-
istically over the life-cycle and affect consumption/savings choices in a unitary household model.
Various specifications of that model have been used to study different questions in the literature:
the welfare effects of different bankruptcy laws in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), the effects
of German reunification on savings behavior in Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2008), and the analysis of day
care subsidies from an optimal taxation perspective in Domeij and Klein (2013).
The contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical and quantitative comparison between
the Single Agent model and the Demographics model in its various specifications. We start by
studying a simple two period model. We find, not surprisingly, that differences in the way de-
mographic effects are specified across models alter the predictions with respect to the timing of
consumption. While both models are obviously reduced-form approaches to more complicated mod-
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els of the family, the Demographics model captures two important channels absent in the Single
Agent model: first, since tomorrow’s assets have to be shared with other household members, the
effective interest rate faced by the household varies over time and is lower than in the Single Agent
model; second, the relative price of consumption across periods varies through changes in the cost
of providing consumption to a household of different size (scale effect) versus a direct utility effect
because a different number of household members enjoys utility from consumption.
We then turn to the question wether the different assumptions about household size (changes)
matter quantitatively in an off-the-shelf standard model of life-cycle consumption with income
uncertainty and incomplete markets as in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). Specifically, we
embed both the Demographics and Single Agent model in this framework and calibrate them using
information on income, household composition and other features of the US economy. All models
are subject to the same macroeconomic restriction, in the sense that we use a common target for the
wealth to income ratio. In order to match this ratio, each specification (the Single Agent model and
the different variations of the Demographics model) exhibit different calibrated discount factors,
which induce households in our model economies to save as much as their empirical counterparts
do in the aggregate.
Using numerical simulations we compare the quantitative predictions for per-adult equivalent
consumption (mean and variance) over the life-cycle. We first perform an exercise for the case when
the relative price of per-adult equivalent consumption across periods is unchanged by demographics
in the Demographics model (scale and utility effects cancel each other), and thus only the effective
interest rates between the two setups differ. This channel is however quantitatively unimportant:
the difference between mean per-adult equivalent consumption is on average 1% (and at most
9% prior to age of retirement) whereas the difference in the log variance of per-adult equivalent
consumption never exceeds 3%.
The two specifications of the Demographics model featuring the largest differences in the relative
price of consumption across periods (relative to each other, due to differences in the strength of
the utility effect) generate differences of similar magnitude as above. Mean consumption during
working life differs at most by 7% and on average by less than a 1%, while the variance of (log)
consumption is virtually the same.
To conclude, our theoretical results show that theDemographics model is conceptually preferable
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to the Single Agent model as it captures economic mechanisms ignored by the latter. Our quan-
titative analysis however demonstrates that differences in predictions of mean and cross-sectional
inequality in consumption over the life-cycle are negligible across models as long as each model is
restricted to generate the same amount of aggregate savings. The intuition behind this result is
simple: when the model is disciplined by an aggregate wealth to income ratio target, the resulting
discount factors offset the differences in the effective interest rate or in the relative price effect of
consumption stemming from different utility effects.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the preference structure
and optimization problem for the Demographics and Single Agent model, and present theoretical
predictions in a stylized two period framework. In Section 3 we layout the model used to quantify
these theoretical predictions. Section 4 presents our quantitative results. We conclude in the last
section.
2 A Two Period Model
2.1 Setup
At least since the empirical work by Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Attanasio and Brown-
ing (1995) it is well understood that household size changes are important for understanding the
patterns of household consumption over the life-cycle. In this section we setup the most sim-
ple framework to analyze two popular approaches for dealing with household size changes in the
consumption-savings literature.
Households live for two periods. Household size is normalized to one in the first period (N1 = 1,
e.g. a young person living alone) and increases deterministically in the second period (N2 > 1, e.g.
a child is born). For the theoretical analysis we only need a change of household size between the
two periods. The quantitative analysis features a full life-cycle model, which emulates basic facts
of the US economy, in terms of earnings processes and family size and composition. Households
receive income Y1 in the first period and Y2 in the second period. We first consider the case when
Y2 is deterministic and introduce income uncertainty in a second step. Households can borrow up
to the natural borrowing constraint at an interest rate r. Unless otherwise noted, we set the interest
rate r to zero and the discount factor to one for the ease of exposition. While this obviously affects
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some of the analytical expressions we derive, it does not alter the qualitative findings regarding the
differences between the Demographics and Single Agent model. Finally, we restrict our attention
to utility functions that satisfy the Inada conditions and are strictly concave in consumption.
2.2 Equivalence Scales
Throughout the entire paper we work with equivalence scales which deflate/transform vari-
ables measured at the household level into per-adult equivalents. We denote the equivalence scale
for consumption by φ and for income by κ, both obviously being a function of household demo-
graphics. The three mechanisms through which household size affects the intra-temporal rate of
transformation between expenditures and consumption services, and that are captured partially
through equivalence scales, are family/public goods, economies of scale, and complementarities,
see e.g. Lazear and Michael (1980). As a concrete example, consider the widely applied OECD
equivalence scale which is given by φOECD = 1+0.7(Nad − 1)+0.5Nch with Nad being the number
of adults and Nch the number of children in the household. This can be interpreted as follows: it
takes $1.7 of consumption expenditures to generate the same level of welfare out of consumption
for a two adult household that $1 achieves for a single member household. In general, equiva-
lence scales are normalized to one for households of size one and increase by a factor smaller than
one, potentially varying with household size and other characteristics as e.g. age, for an additional
household member.
Lewbel (1997) provides an extensive survey with a particular emphasis on the main challenges
when it comes to equivalence scales: definition, identification and estimation. These three issues are
highly controversial and seem to be far from being settled. The equivalence scales used in actual
policy making are rather simple weighting schemes as the OECD scale, see Citro and Michaels
(1995) for a lengthy discussion. We follow the macroeconomic literature on income and consumption
inequality (to whom this paper is the most relevant) where these latter equivalence scales are
commonly used.1
1Two recent macroeconomic papers take a different approach. Salcedo, Schoellman, and Tertilt (2012) develop
a theory and quantitative model of household formation in which equivalence scales are an endogenous outcome of
the household size, and the expenditure shares on private and public consumption goods. As households get richer
they become smaller and spend more on private goods which decreases the ’measured’ economies of scale. Hong and
R´ıos-Rull (2012) estimate household-type specific equivalence scales in the context a life-cycle model with stochastic
changes in household size and composition using life-insurance holdings.
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2.3 Demographics Model
We start with the setup in which household size Nt affects the marginal utility of consumption.
In particular, we assume a unitarian framework in which a household decision maker allocates
household consumption CDt optimally to the two periods
max
CD
1
,CD
2
U = u(CD1 , N1) + u(C
D
2 , N2) (1)
subject to
C
D
1 + C
D
2 = Y1 + Y2. (2)
Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999), and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) where the first
to use such a framework and specified the dependence of the marginal utility of consumption on
demographics via a general taste shifter:
u(Ct, Nt) = exp(ξNt)u (Ct) . (3)
Subsequent papers used a similar specification which we also use in the remainder of the paper:
u(CDt , Nt) = δ(Nt)u
(
C
D
t
φ(Nt)
)
. (4)
Note that there is no private consumption and household consumption is transformed into per-adult
equivalent consumption by dividing with the equivalence scale φ(Nt). δ(Nt) can be best interpreted
as aggregating up the individual utilities from per-adult equivalent consumption u
(
CDt
φ(Nt)
)
of all
household members, or alternatively, as a parameter reflecting altruism towards other household
members by the household decision maker. E.g. if the household planner assigns each household
member i (including herself) a weight δ¯i then δ(Nt) =
∑Nt
i=1 δ¯i. While there are certainly more
elaborate models of the household (e.g. Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003), and Mazzocco,
Ruiz, and Yamaguchi (2007)), we use this formulation as it nests various specifications used in recent
contributions in quantitative macroeconomics: Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), Attanasio,
Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) set δ(Nt) = 1 such that in each period the household planer
maximizes per-capita utility or alternatively the household planer does not have any altruism
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towards the remaining household members; Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2008) and Laitner and Silverman
(2012) use δ(Nt) = φ(Nt), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012) use the number of adults
in the household and Domeij and Klein (2013) the total number of household members.
2.4 Single Agent Model
A more common approach is to assume that households consist only of one single member in
any period. To ensure consistency between the model and the data, one popular strategy is to
transform total household consumption in the data into a per-adult equivalent consumption by the
division with an equivalence scale. An alternative method is to estimate household size/composition
effects directly from micro data using least squares regressions, as in Aguiar and Hurst (2013),
which then can be trivially converted to an ad-hoc equivalence scale. The predictions of the Single
Agent model are then compared to the empirical per-adult equivalent consumption.2 Consequently,
income fed into the model is cleaned as well for household size and household composition effects.
In particular, in the inequality literature household income is divided by the same equivalence
scale used for consumption, see e.g. Cutler and Katz (1992), Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell,
Low, and Preston (2013), Meyer and Sullivan (2013), and the 2010 special issue of the Review
of Economic Dynamics (Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and Violante (2010)). An alternative is to use
only the household heads income as done by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008), Low
and Pistaferri (2010), and Kaplan (2012). We adjust income with the factor κ(Nt) as a stand-in
for these different empirical strategies to obtain a per-adult equivalent income. In all considered
cases κ(Nt) is normalized to one for a household of size one and the household chooses per-adult
equivalent consumption cSt to solve the following optimization problem
max
cS
1
,cS
2
U = u
(
cS1
)
+ u(cS2 ) (5)
subject to
cS1 + c
S
2 =
Y1
κ1(N1)
+
Y2
κ2(N2)
. (6)
The key distinctive feature between the two setups is how demographics affect the optimization
2See Blundell, Low, and Preston (2013), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) or Low and Pistaferri
(2010).
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problem. The Single Agent model abstracts from household (changes) inside the model, but is
’calibrated’ in a fashion that controls for these effects outside the model. Household effects enter
only via the budget constraint. In contrast, in the Demographics model household size changes
affect utility directly but not the budget constraint.
It is straightforward to make the optimal consumption allocations comparable. The Single
Agent model directly predicts per-adult equivalent consumption (in our notation the lower case
letter c) because the household receives a per-adult equivalent income. In the Demographics model,
household consumption (in our notation an upper case letter C) is predicted which can be easily
transformed into per-adult equivalent consumption by deflating it with the equivalence scale φt,
i.e.
CD1
φ1
=
CD1
1 and
CD2
φ2
.
The objective of the following paragraphs is to compare the predictions of the different specifi-
cations of the Demographics and Single Agent model with each other, and to highlight the economic
forces at work which distinguish the different setups.
2.5 Consumption Growth Rate
Proposition 1. The per-adult equivalent consumption growth rates in the Demographics model
and Single Agent model are the same if and only if δ2 = φ2.
This result can be immediately read of from the two Euler equations for the Demographics
model (7) and Single Agent model (8):
u′(CD1 ) =
δ2
φ2
u′
(
C
D
2
φ2
)
(7)
u′(cS1 ) = u
′(cS2 ). (8)
In both first-order conditions only per-adult equivalent consumption appears. Equation (8)
implies no per-adult equivalent consumption growth in the Single Agent model, i.e. cS1 = c
S
2 which
in the Demographics model occurs if and only if δ2 = φ2. We specifically want to emphasize here
the very different implications for different specifications of the Demographics model: if δ2 > φ2 ⇒
C
D
1 =
CD
1
φ1
<
CD
2
φ2
, i.e. per-adult equivalent consumption grows over time, while the opposite is true
for δ2 < φ2. The intuition behind this result can be best explained as follows. An additional unit
of period two household consumption generates only 1φ2 units of per-adult equivalent consumption,
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i.e. each household member does not get the full unit to consume. The implied marginal utility
u′
(
CD
2
φ2
)
accruing to each household member from consuming this additional unit of per-adult
equivalent consumption is then aggregated up to the household level by multiplication with the
weighting/altruism factor δ2.
As an example, consider the case of δ2 = 1 < φ2. The larger household size in period two
provides an incentive to decrease per-adult equivalent consumption in period two. Household
consumption needs to be shared with more people but the household does not value the utility
from per-adult equivalent consumption enjoyed by these additional members.3
The ratio δ2φ2 has a similar interpretation as β(1+r) in standard Euler equations: it changes the
effective discount factor in the Euler equation, or alternatively, it changes the relative price of per-
adult equivalent consumption between two periods whenever there is a change in household size.
This ’demographic’ channel is absent in the Single Agent model and in the Demographics model if
and only if δ2 = φ2. Furthermore, this result is completely independent from κ2, the deflator used
to construct per-adult equivalent income for the calibration of the Single Agent model.
2.6 Consumption Growth Rates and Income Uncertainty
This section introduces income uncertainty, the empirically more relevant case, in the most
simplistic fashion. Period two income can take two values: Y2,l with probability pl and Y2,h with
probability ph = 1− pl, where Y2,h > Y2,l. Households are (as before) only allowed to borrow what
can be repaid for sure, i.e. at most Y2,l. To highlight the key distinction between the Demographics
and Single Agent model in the presence of income uncertainty, we consider the more general case of
a non-zero interest rate but maintain the assumption of β(1+ r) = 1. The implied Euler equations
3Note that in the Demographics model household consumption may nevertheless increase even if δ2 < φ2. In
particular with CRRA preferences this is true as long as δ2 > φ
1−α
2 , with α being the coefficient of relative risk
aversion.
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for the Demographics model (9) and Single Agent model (10) are given by:
u′
(
C
D
1
)
=
δ2
φ2
∑
i=l,h
piu
′
=CD
2
/φ2
︷ ︸︸ ︷[Y1 − CD1 ] 1 + rφ2 + Y2,iφ2

 (9)
u′
(
cS1
)
=
∑
i=l,h
piu
′

[Y1 − cS1 ] (1 + r) + Y2,iκ2︸ ︷︷ ︸


=cS
2
(10)
where period two consumption in each Euler equation has been replaced with the respective
life-time budget constraint from the Demographics (11) and Single Agent model (12):
C
D
1 +
C
D
2
1 + r
= Y1 +
Y2,i
1 + r
∀ i = l, h (11)
cS1 +
cS2
1 + r
= Y1 +
Y2,i
(1 + r)κ2
∀ i = l, h (12)
While in both models period two per-adult equivalent income (i.e. deflated with the respective
equivalence scale) shows up in the marginal utility on the right hand side, period one assets (i.e.
period one income less period one consumption) are multiplied with two different effective interest
rates. The return to savings is only 1+rφ2 in the Demographics model whereas it is 1 + r in the
Single Agent model. It is more expensive (cheaper) to save (borrow) in the Demographics model
compared to the Single Agent model because of the lower effective interest rate payments received
(to be paid). This generates differences in the resources required to provide insurance against the
low income shock and drives an additional wedge between the two models independent of the ratio
of δ and φ. Obviously, the difference in the effective interest rates in the two models is also present
without income uncertainty but does not affect the choice of per-adult equivalent consumption
growth in this case.
In the subsequent analysis, we return to our simplified setting with r = 0 and β = 1. Again,
this simplification is only made for the ease of exposition and does not alter the qualitative results
regarding the differences between the two model setups.
Proposition 2. If there is income uncertainty and the optimal per-adult equivalent consumption
growth rates in the Demographics and Single Agent model are the same, then κ2 = 1+ (φ2− 1)C
D
1
YD
1
.
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The detailed proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix A.1. It presumes that the Euler
equations Equations (9) and (10) are satisfied (same per-adult equivalent consumption growth rate
in each state of the world; necessary for optimality) and that the budget constraints hold with
equality (ensures feasibility). Therefore Proposition 2 constitutes only a necessary condition, i.e.
there exist at most one κ2 for which the optimal per-adult equivalent consumption profiles in the
two models are the same.
Before discussing a sufficient condition, we briefly provide the intuition for the critical value of
κ2 stated in Proposition 2: If the household in the Demographics model neither saves nor borrows,
κ2 equals φ2. If the household in the Demographics model is a saver, the household receives a lower
effective interest rate than the household in the Single Agent model. This makes it (as described
above) relatively more expensive to provide insurance because of the lower return to savings. To
counteract this, κ2 has to decrease below φ2. Lowering κ2 has two opposing effects: first, it increases
period two per-adult equivalent income in any state with a positive income; second, it increases
income uncertainty in period two. Key is that income uncertainty relative to expected life-time
per-adult equivalent income increases. This can be seen from the coefficient of variation:
CV S =
S.D.(Y1 + Y2,i/κ2)
Y1 +
∑
i=l,h piY2,i/κ2
=
S.D.(Y2,i)
κ2Y1 +
∑
i=l,h piY2,i
. (13)
Put differently, if the household in the Demographics model saves and faces a lower effective return
on these savings, the household in the Single Agent model has to be endowed with a more risky
income process (relative to κ2 = φ2). Note that for Y1=0, the critical value for κ in Proposition 2
is not defined. In this case the per-adult equivalent consumption growth rates are never the same.
In both models, the household has to borrow but in the Demographics model the effective interest
rate is smaller. Varying κ does however not change relative income risk any longer if Y1 = 0, see
Equation (13).
The two next propositions, partly building on Proposition 2, are together the counterpart of
Proposition 1 for the case of income uncertainty. To obtain analytical solutions, we need to restrict
our attention to utility functions whose first derivative u′ is homogenous of degree q - a property that
the most commonly used utility function in the quantitative macro literature, CRRA preferences,
satisfies.
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Proposition 3. If u′ is homogenous of degree q and δ2 6= φ2, then the optimal per-adult equivalent
consumption growth rates in the Demographics and Single Agent model are never the same.
Assume to the contrary, the optimal growth rates would be the same, i.e.
cS1 = ηC
D
1 and c
S
2,i = η
C
D
2,i
φ2
∀ i = l, h with η > 0. (14)
Plugging allocation (14) in the Euler equation (10) for the Single Agent model and using the
homogeneity assumption yields
ηqu′
(
C
D
1
)
= ηq
∑
i=l,h
piu
′
(
C
D
2,i
φ2
)
. (15)
Comparing Equation (15) and the Euler equation in the Demographics model (9), it is obvious
that both cannot hold jointly at the allocation (14) if δ2 6= φ2. It is important to mention that
Proposition 3 is independent of the choice of κ2. This underpins the claim made above: Proposition
2 constitutes only a necessary condition in the sense that there exists at most one κ2 for which the
per-adult equivalent consumption growth rates in the two models are the same. In fact, Proposition
3 is an example where no such κ2 exists. Next, we state a sufficient condition under which the
per-adult equivalent consumption profiles in the two models are the same.
Proposition 4. If u′ is homogenous of degree q, δ2 = φ2 and κ2 = 1+(φ2−1)C
D
1
YD
1
, then the optimal
per-adult equivalent consumption growth rates from the Demographics model and the Single Agent
model are the same.
The detailed proof of Proposition 4 is given in Appendix A.2. Building on Proposition 2,
Proposition 4 is a sufficient condition for the per-adult equivalent consumption growth rates in the
two models being the same. Propositions 3 and 4 together are the counterpart of Proposition 1 for
the case of income uncertainty. However, it takes more than only δ2 = φ2 for the Single Agent model
to generate the same per-adult equivalent consumption growth rates as in the Demographics model:
first, homogeneity of u′; second, a specific value of κ2 which depends on the optimal consumption
choice in the Demographics model.
11
3 Quantitative Model
3.1 Basic Setup
We now move to a full life-cycle model, which emulates basic facts of the US economy, in terms of
earnings processes and family size and composition to compare the quantitative predictions across
models. We set up a standard incomplete markets life-cycle model, which follows closely the one
in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). For simplicity, we do however abstract from population
growth and prices being determined in general equilibrium.
In the model, households start their economic life in period t0 with zero assets. During their
working life until period tw they receive a stochastic income in every period. There is no labor
supply choice. From period tw + 1 onwards households are retired and have to live from their
accumulated savings during working life.4 Life ends with certainty at age T but there is an age
specific survival probability ζt. Households have access to a risk-free bond a which pays the interest
rate r and can borrow at the same interest rate up to the natural borrowing constraint, i.e. an age
specific level amin,t of debt that they can repay for sure. Annuity markets are actuarially fair such
that the assets of the dying population are redistributed equally among the surviving members of
their cohort. Age T households do not leave bequests and cannot die with debt.
In the Demographics model, household size changes over the life-cycle deterministically as in
Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and is homogenous
across all households. The maximization problem is given by
max
{at+1}
T−1
t=t0
E0
T∑
t=t0
(
Πj=tj=t0ζj
)
βt−t0 δtu
(
ct
φt
)
(16)
subject to (17)
ct + at+1 ≤ at(1 + r)
ζt
+ yt ∀ t ≤ tw (18)
ct + at+1 ≤ at(1 + r)
ζt
∀ tw < t ≤ T (19)
at+1 ≥ amin,t (20)
4The online appendix shows results with a social security system in place. The qualitative predictions for the
differences across models are in line with our benchmark economies and the conclusions are the same.
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where δ and φ are functions of household size and its composition (Nad,t and Nch,t) over the life-
cycle. Note that in contrast to Section 2, we now denote all variables with lower case letters. Pre
labor tax income yt is stochastic during the working life, i.e. as long as t ≤ tw, and is given by the
following process:
ln yt = ̺t + ǫ
F + zt + ǫ
Tr
t (21)
where ̺t is an age-dependent, exogenous experience profile common to all individuals, ǫ
F is a fixed
effect drawn by households at the beginning of economic life from a normal distribution with mean
zero and variance σ2F , zt is a permanent shock to labor income, with
zt = ρzt−1 + ǫ
P
t with ǫ
P
t ∼ N(0, σ2P ) (22)
and ǫTr ∼ N(0, σ2Tr) is a transitory shock.
The structure of the Single Agent problem is very similar. Demographics do not affect the
marginal utility of consumption while income yt is deflated by household size through the equiva-
lence scale κt:
max
{at+1}
T−1
t=t0
E0
T∑
t=t0
(
Πj=tj=t0ζj
)
βt−t0 u (ct) subject to (23)
ct + at+1 ≤ at(1 + r)
ζt
+
yt
κt
∀ t ≤ tw (24)
ct + at+1 ≤ at(1 + r)
ζt
∀ tw < t ≤ T (25)
at+1 ≥ amin,t, (26)
with yt following the same process as for the Demographics model given by Equations (21) and
(22).
3.2 Quantitative Features of the Model
A model period is one year. Agents start life at age 25, retire when 65 and live until age 95
after which they die with certainty. The common profile for survival probabilities comes from the
National Center for Health Statistics (1994). To maintain comparability across models, we keep
some parameters fixed: we pick common choices from the literature and set the interest rate at
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2.25% (the average of the t-bill rate minus inflation, between 1984 and 2003, IMF Statistics) and
work with CRRA preferences (α = 2), i.e. for the Demographics model we use:
u = δ(Nad,t, Nch,t)
(
ct
φ(Nad,t,Nch,t)
)1−α
1− α , (27)
and for the Single Agent model we use:
u =
c1−αt
1− α. (28)
We follow Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and choose the discount factor, β, so that the
model’s aggregate net wealth/income ratio matches that of the lower 99% wealth quantile in the
U.S. from Table 6 in Dı´az-Gime´nez, Quadrini, and Rı´os-Rull (1997), this ratio is 3.1
We use as the square root scale φSQRt =
√
Nad +Nch to transform household into per-adult
equivalent consumption. This scale is now used by the OECD and almost identical to the equiv-
alence scale preferred by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) which is the mean over six
representative equivalence scales used in the empirical consumption literature. Furthermore, we
use the same equivalence scale for computing per-adult equivalent income and per-adult equivalent
consumption (κt = φt) as done in studies investigating jointly income and consumption inequality,
see e.g. Cutler and Katz (1992), Krueger and Perri (2006), Meyer and Sullivan (2013), and the
2010 special issue of the Review of Economic Dynamics (Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and Violante
(2010)).
As for utility weights, we remain agnostic and compare three cases: (i) δt = 1 represents the case
when there is no altruism towards additional households members (as e.g. in Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2007), Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)); (ii) δt = Nt = Nad,t + Nch,t (as
e.g. in Domeij and Klein (2013)) is the opposite with full altruism; and (iii) an intermediate case
when δt = φt (as e.g. in Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2008) and Laitner and Silverman (2012)).
For the deterministic income profiles, we use data from the Current Population Survey, from
1984 to 2003, in particular, the March supplements for years 1985 to 2004, given that questions
about income are retrospective. We chose this sample in order to maintain comparability with
the Consumer Expenditure Survey sample used to compute consumption facts by related literature
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(which we refer to below). We use total wage income (deflated by CPI-U, leaving amounts in 2000
US dollars). We construct total household income Wiτ for household i observed in year τ , as the
sum of individual incomes in the household for all households with at least one full time/full year
worker. The latter is defined as someone who worked more than 40 hours per week and more
than 40 weeks per year and earned more than $2 per hour. To get life-cycle experience profiles,
we estimate linear regressions on a set of age dummies, controlling for time and cohort effects as
described in Deaton and Paxson (1994).5 The set of estimated coefficients for the age dummies
is our object of interest, which we smooth using a quartic polynomial on age, see Figure 4a in
Appendix B.
To parameterize the stochastic part of the income process in (21) and (22) we pick the parameter
estimates from Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and set ρ = 0.9989, σ2F = 0.2105, σ
2
P =
0.0166 and σ2Tr = 0.063. We discretize this calibrated process using the Rouwenhorst method,
using 17, 2 and 2 points for the permanent, transitory and fixed effect components respectively.
This methodology is specially suited for our case given the high persistence of the process, see the
discussion in Kopecky and Suen (2010).
To compute profiles for family size and composition, we use the March supplements of the CPS
for the years 1984 to 2003. For each household, we count the number of adults (individuals age
17+) and the number of children: individuals age 16 or less who are identified as being the ’child’
of an adult in the household. We compute two separate profiles: one for number of adults and
one for number of children. As above, we run dummy regressions to extract life-cycle profiles,
where the considered age is that of the head (irrespective of gender) and control for cohort and
year effects as described above. After extracting these life-cycle profiles, we smooth them using a
cubic polynomial in age, and restrict the number of children to zero after age 60, see Figure 4b in
Appendix B.
5Deaton and Paxson (1994) impose restrictions on the year dummies to break the collinearity between age, birth
cohort and year dummies: the coeffcient estimates of the year dummies have to sum up to one and the sum over the
coefficient estimates of year dummies interacted with the respective time trend indicator need to equal zero as well.
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4 Results
In the paragraphs below, we relate our theoretical results to two quantitative exercises: first, we
compare the Demographics model with δ = φ to the Single Agent model to focus on the role of the
different effective interest rate. Second, we compare the different specifications of the Demographics
model with each other to analyze the role of differences in the relative price of consumption across
periods. Similar to the benchmark case in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), our simulated
economies do not feature a pension system. The qualitative predictions for the differences across
models are in line with our benchmark economies and the conclusions are the same if we introduce
a US-style pension system as described in that same paper.6
4.1 Demographics model with δ = φ vs. Single Agent model
We first focus on the comparison between the Demographics model when δ = φ and the Single
Agentmodel. The key prediction of our theoretical analysis is that per-adult equivalent consumption
growth rates are in general different between the two model setups, unless income is certain or the
income deflator κ takes on a specific value (which is not guaranteed to exist at all). These results are
derived under the assumption that the remaining parameters (preferences, prices) coincide across
models. This is also the case in our quantitative exercise except for the discount factor β which
is calibrated to match a wealth to income ratio of 3.1 in each economy. The resulting β for the
Demographics model is 0.959, and 0.946 for the Single Agent model respectively. Since the effective
return to savings is lower in the Demographics model, the discount factor in the Single Agent model
has to be higher in order to generate the same wealth to income ratio. In order to distinguish more
clearly the role of differences in the effective interest rate and differences in the discount factor, we
add a further specification to the following analysis: we simulate the Single Agent model again with
the discount factor from the Demographics model, i.e. with β = 0.959, which increases the wealth
to income ratio to 3.65.
Figure 1a shows the mean per-adult equivalent consumption profiles between the three simu-
lations. During retirement, i.e. in the absence of income uncertainty, [β(1 + r)]1/γ determines the
6We direct interested readers to the online appendix for that as well as for additional results regarding the
implications for insurance coefficients as in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010),
and for empirical estimates of δ based on the work by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999).
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Figure 1: Per-adult equivalent consumption: Single Agent vs. Demographics with δ = φ
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growth rate of per-adult equivalent consumption. Hence, after age 65 per-adult equivalent con-
sumption decreases at a faster rate in the Single Agent model with the calibrated discount factor
(β = 0.946) compared to the Demographics model and Single Agent model with β = 0.959.
Income uncertainty during working life induces the households to accumulate precautionary
savings and generates the upward sloping consumption profile during the first part of the life-cycle
in all three simulations despite β(1 + r) < 1. The consumption profiles for all three simulations
are very close to each other during working-life. The difference is on average less than 1%. The
lower calibrated discount factor in the Single Agent generates a stronger hump-shaped consumption
profile and makes mean consumption more different during retirement.7
The lower effective return to savings in the Demographics model make it more costly to insure
against income shocks. This implies less consumption insurance in the Demographics model com-
pared to the Single Agent model when holding fixed the discount factor between the two models,
which results in a slightly higher variance of log (per-adult equivalent) consumption in the former
compared to the latter. The lower calibrated discount factor in the Single Agent model shifts con-
sumption more to the earlier years (in relative terms) which generates a 3% higher variance during
retirement.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that per-adult equivalent consumption growth is higher in
7There are also level differences in mean per-adult equivalent consumption across models. The online appendix
provides a theoretical explanation for this fact.
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Figure 2: Per-Adult Equivalent Consumption: Different Specifications of the Demographics Model
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our benchmark relative to the data as documented in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007):
the peak age of per-adult equivalent consumption is in the early 50s in the data while it is around
57 in our model; at the peak age, per-adult equivalent consumption increases by 30% in the data
relative to age 25, whereas in our setup, it more than doubles. On the other hand, the profile
for the variance of log per-adult equivalent consumption is roughly in line with the data shown in
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), being somewhat higher at the end of life in our simulation.
Overall, although the theoretical predictions of the previous section are validated, the quan-
titative differences between the three simulations are of second order for the mean consumption
profiles and barely perceptible for consumption inequality.
4.2 Different Specifications of the Demographics Model
While the discussion of the two period model mainly focussed on the case of δ = φ, we think
that the implications of the Euler equation (7) for different choices of δ deserve more attention in
our quantitative analysis here as these vary widely in applied work: from δ = 1 (as e.g. in Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) and Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)) to the intermediate
cases of δ = φ (as e.g. in Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2008) and Laitner and Silverman (2012)) and number of
adults (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012)) to household size (Domeij and Klein (2013)).
Recall that the Euler equation (7) implies that the household, ceteris paribus, allocates more
per-adult equivalent consumption to periods in which household size is large if δ > φ and vice
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versa. Different choices of the utility weight are associated with different relative prices of per-
adult equivalent consumption between two periods whereas the effective interest rates are the same
across all specifications. In our quantitative exercise, the discount factors vary across the different
choices of δ in order to match for each simulation a wealth-income ratio of 3.1. On average this
yields very similar profiles for per-adult equivalent consumption (this is also true for total household
consumption) and virtually the same profiles for consumption inequality over the life-cycle, see
Figures 2a and 2b respectively.
When δ = 1, the utility that additional household members derive from consumption is not
valued by the household decision maker, while at the same time, the scale effect is still in place
(consumption has to be shared). When the utility weight equals household size (δ = N) we have
the opposite case: households want to allocate more consumption to periods when their size is
bigger. In the 20s and around age 60, when household size is small relative to the 30s and 40s,
per-adult equivalent consumption in the model with δ = 1 is higher than when δ equals φ or 1. In
contrast, when δ = N , per-adult equivalent consumption is the highest among the three models
when household size is the largest, i.e. during the 30s and 40s. However, the differences in mean
per-adult equivalent consumption between these two ’extreme’ cases never exceed 7% and are on
average less than 1% during working life.
The different utility weights do not exhibit a stronger quantitative impact because of the macroe-
conomic discipline imposed by the wealth to income ratio target in the calibration stage. The cali-
brated discount factors are increasing in δ: β = 0.949 for δ = 1, β = 0.959 for δ = φ and β = 0.969
for δ = N . In periods when household size is large, households need a stronger preference for current
consumption to prevent them from saving too much when δ = 1, whereas when δ = N , households
need to be more patient to prevent them from consuming too much. When we do not constrain the
models to generate the same wealth to income ratio and hold the discount factor constant across
models (we set all βs equal to 0.959), the choice of δ exhibits a stronger impact on the mean profile
of per-adult equivalent consumption and also generates differences in consumption inequality, see
Figures 3a and 3b. The differences in mean consumption between the setups with δ = 1 and δ = N
during working life are on average above 5% with a maximum of 9%, while the variance of log
per-adult equivalent consumption during retirement reaches 6.5%. When δ = 1, households now
shift consumption to a larger degree to the later part of the life-cycle (smaller household size) and
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Figure 3: Per-Adult Equivalent Cons.: Diff. Specifications of the Demographics Model (β = 0.959)
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are more willing to consume comparably little even in the presence of low income realizations. The
higher accumulated savings generate the lower consumption inequality relative to δ = φ and δ = 1.
To sum up, the choice of Demographics model (in terms of different utility weights δ’s) can
have important qualitative consequences for average and cross-sectional inequality of per-adult
equivalent consumption. However, the quantitative importance of this channel is counteracted by
the macroeconomic discipline imposed by the wealth to income ratio targeted in the calibration
stage, making the theoretical differences seem of second order importance. This finding might
explain the results in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), who setup a quantitative life-cycle
model, very similar to the one considered here, extended by expenditures shocks (health or divorce)
and the option to default on debt. In their baseline setting, they set δ = 1 and show that welfare is
lower under an EU-style bankruptcy law compared to the US law. In their robustness analysis they
show that this result depends amongst other things on how demographics are modeled. Specifically,
they solve their model without an effect of household size on the (marginal) utility of consumption
which in fact is nothing else but decreasing the utility weight δ from one to φ1−α with CRRA
preferences, see Equation (27). Under this setting, the EU-style bankruptcy law yields higher
ex-ante welfare. This suggest that changes in the slope of the consumption profile induced by
differences in δ may have important implications. However, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) do
not recalibrate their model to match a certain aggregate moment and thereby potentially overstate
the effect of δ on their results.
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5 Conclusions
At least since the empirical work by Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Attanasio and Brown-
ing (1995) it is well understood that household size changes are important for understanding the
patterns of household consumption over the life-cycle. In this paper we compare two widely used
versions of the life-cycle model of consumption addressing this issue: the Single Agent model, in
which household size is constant over the life-cycle and which is calibrated with a per-adult equiv-
alent income; and the Demographics model, in which household size changes deterministically over
the life-cycle and impacts the marginal utility of consumption, while household income is used in
the calibration. Given the widely accepted notion that demographics should be taken into account
for applied work, the objective of this paper is to document the implications of using different
models for consumption and consumption inequality over the life-cycle.
While both models are obviously reduced-form approaches to more complicated models of the
family, the Demographics model captures two channels that are absent in the Single Agent model:
first, since tomorrow’s assets have to be shared with other household members, the effective interest
rate faced by the household varies over time and is lower than in the Single Agent model; second,
the relative price of consumption across periods varies through changes in the cost of providing
consumption to an additional household member versus the direct preference over an additional
household member receiving utility from consumption.
We investigate the quantitative implications of these differences in a standard model of life-cycle
consumption with income uncertainty and incomplete markets, similar to the one in Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004). Specifically, we embed both the Demographics and Single Agentmodel in
this framework and calibrate them using information on income, household composition and other
features of the US economy. All models are subject to the same macroeconomic restriction, in the
sense of a common target for the wealth to income ratio. In order to match this ratio, each different
specification (the Single Agentmodel or the different variations of the Demographics model) exhibits
a different calibrated discount factor, which makes households in our model economies to save as
much as their empirical counterparts do in the aggregate. Under this restriction, the qualitative
differences arising from the different setups and assumptions are quantitatively negligible. The
intuition behind this result is simple: when the model is disciplined by an aggregate wealth to
income ratio target, the resulting discount factors offset the differences in the effective interest rate
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or in the relative price effect of consumption stemming from different utility effects. Put differently,
while our theoretical results show that the Demographics model is conceptually preferable to the
Single Agent model, our quantitative analysis demonstrates that it is largely irrelevant which model
(specification) is used.
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Appendix
A Two Period Model
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The per-adult equivalent consumption profiles in the two approaches can only be the same if
for these allocations the following condition holds
cS1 = ηC
D
1 and c
S
2,i = η
C
D
2,i
φ2
∀ i = l, h with η > 0. (29)
Without loss of generality, assume that {CD1 ,CD2,l,CD2,h} also satisfies the budget constraint (11) in
the Demographics model, i.e. this allocation is optimal. The allocation (29) in the Single Agent
model can however also only constitute an optimum if for the low and high income shock the
respective budget constraints
cS1 + c
S
2,i = Y1 +
Y2,i
κ2
∀ i = l, h (30)
hold with equality, i.e. the allocation is feasible and no resources are wasted. Replacing condition
(29) into the budget constraints of the Single Agentmodel (30) and replacing CD2,i with the respective
budget constraint from the Demographics model yields after some reformulations
C
D
1 =
1
φ2 − 1
1
η
[
(φ2 − η)Y1 +
(
φ2
ηκ2
− 1
)
Y2,i
]
∀ i = l, h. (31)
Equation (31) has to hold for the low and high period two income realization which can only be
the case if
η =
φ2
κ2
. (32)
Using condition (32) we can solve Equation (31) for the κ2 for which the per-adult equivalent
consumption in the two approaches are the same:
κ2 = 1 + (φ2 − 1)C
D
1
Y1
. (33)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that our results are derived for r = 0 and β = 1. Without loss of generality, assume that
{CD1 ,CD2,l,CD2,h} satisfies the Euler equation (9) and the budget constraint (11) in the Demographics
model. Hence, the allocation in the Demographics model is optimal. We show that a consumption
allocation for the Single Agent model exists that implies the same per-adult equivalent consumption
profile as the Demographics model, satisfies the Euler equation (10) and for κ2 = 1+(φ2−1)C
D
1
Y1
the
budget constraint in the Single Agent model. Since we assume a strictly concave utility function
this allocation has to be the unique optimum in the Single Agent model.
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The profile in the Single Agent model is the same as in the Demographics model if
cS1 = ηC
D
1 and c
S
2,i = η
C
D
2,i
φ2
∀ i = l, h with η > 0. (34)
Plugging allocation (34) in the Euler equation (10) for the Single Agent model and using the
homogeneity assumption yields
ηqu′
(
C
D
1
)
= ηq
∑
i=l,h
piu
′
(
C
D
2,i
φ2
)
. (35)
Comparing Equation (35) and the Euler equation in the Demographics model (9), it is obvious that
both hold jointly at the allocation (34) if δ2 = φ2.
The next step is to show that for κ2 = 1+(φ2−1)C
D
1
Y1
the budget constraint in the Single Agent
model holds with equality for the allocation (34) for the low and high income shock. We start with
the budget constraint in the Demographics model which has to hold for the low (i = l) and high
(i = h) income:
Y1 + Y2,i = C
D
1 + C
D
2 (36)
Now plug allocation (34) into Equation (36). The derivation of the critical value of κ2 relied on
η = φ2κ2 which we us as well in this step:
Y1 +Y2,i =
1
η
cS1 +
φ2
η
cS2,i =
κ2
φ2
cS1 + κ2c
S
2,i
⇒ Y1
κ2
+
Y2,i
κ2
=
cS1
φ2
+ cS2,i
(37)
Now plug allocation (34) in the critical value of κ2 and solve for κ2 (again using η =
φ2
κ2
):
κ2 = 1 + (φ2 − 1)C
D
1
Y1
= 1 + (φ2 − 1)1
η
cS1
Y1
= 1 + (φ2 − 1)κ2
φ2
cS1
Y1
⇒ κ2 = 1
1− φ2−1φ2
cS
1
Y1
(38)
Inserting (38) in (37) for Y1κ2 yields after a few reformulations the budget constraint for low
(i = l) and high (i = h) period two income realization in the Single Agent model (compare (30)):
cS1
φ2
+ cS2,i =
Y1
κ2
+
Y2,i
κ2
cS1
φ2
+ cS2,i = Y1
(
1− φ2 − 1
φ2
cS1
Y1
)
+
Y2,i
κ2
= Y1 − Y1φ2 − 1
φ2
cS1
Y1
+
Y2,i
κ2
= Y1 − cS1 +
cS1
φ2
+
Y2,i
κ2
⇒ cS1 + cS2,i = Y1 +
Y2,i
κ2
(39)
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B Figures
Figure 4: Model Inputs
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Note: All profiles are constructed using data from the CPS, 1984-2003.
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